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BOOK REVIEWS 
 
Candland, Douglas Keith, Feral Children and Clever Animals: 
Reflections on Human Nature, xiii + 411pp. (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford,1993). 
   
Feral Children and Clever Animals  purports to be about attempts by 
humans to know about themselves by trying to understand the minds of 
other beings: feral children and animals, and at least in the first half, it 
fulfils this aim quite well. The discussion of the animal studies however 
involves very little reflection on the investigators and is mainly confined 
to a summary of the published results along with some questions about 
what they might mean. 
 
The 'feral children' who are the focus of the first half of the book are 
Peter, Victor, Kaspar Hauser, Amala and Kamala. Candland looks at the 
aims of the 18th and 19th century investigators of these children rather 
than the specifics of the children's behaviour or abilities. It is the minds 
of the investigators rather than the feral children that he sees of interest. 
This is a novel slant on these stories and it allows Candland to present 
his view of the history of psychology.  
 
According to Candland, those who studied Peter discovered in the 18th 
century, were primarily concerned with the question, 'what behaviour is 
innate and what behaviour is learned?' and the social/political 
ramifications of the answer.  I wonder whether this description is 
accurate given that the emphasis on behaviour  seems to be a feature of a 
much more recent psychology.  It is clear however that the general 
question about what in humans is innate and what is learned was an 
important one at the time. Itard's study of Victor, Candland tells us, was 
premised on a division between the senses, the intellect and the 
emotions, foreshadowing the idea of psychology as being composed of 
three functions that can be studied separately.  Kasper Hauser is included 
in Candland's reflections as a feral child but he was not strictly one. He 
was raised by humans in confinement and with minimal sustenance. The 
discussion here is inconclusive as it seems no one attempted a study of 
Kasper Hauser's abilities, the 'experts' being more concerned with the 
illegality of confinement.  
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Amala and Kamala, both reared by wolves were investigated to 
determine how or whether culture could be taught. The mother wolf was 
cruelly killed in front of them. Reverend Singh, the chief investigator 
wrote that up to three months after capture they showed a dislike for 
everything human and Amala died shortly after capture. It is curious that 
Candland makes nothing of these events. In fact the book engages only 
very fleetingly with moral issues in the conclusion. 
 
Candland introduces a discussion of four directions in contemporary 
psychology: the notion of measuring mental ability, psychoanalysis, 
behaviourism and phenomenology. Psychoanalysis is presented through 
Freud's  account of Little Hans and many key concepts are clearly 
portrayed. Candland insists on the utility rather than the veracity of 
psychoanalysis, incorrectly I think, attributing such a perspective to 
Freud. 
Supposedly leading into his discussion of behaviourism, Candland 
outlines the accounts of the abilities of the horses, Clever Hans, Zarif 
and Muhamed, suggesting that experts' descriptions had a great deal to 
do with their expectations. Interestingly Candland argues for the 
cleverness of Hans on grounds other than those provided by 
contemporary experts. Behaviourism is in fact barely mentioned.  
 
Phenomenology is introduced with a discussion of the reading abilities 
of certain dogs and the investigators' attempts to communicate via words 
with the dogs. Candland argues that the questions of those who studied 
these horses and dogs move away from those asked of the feral children 
towards an emphasis on communication.  The idea of a mental ladder 
which arranges animal species by their intelligence is then introduced 
looking at the studies of chimpanzees early this century in the United 
States and Garner's attempts to study chimpanzee communication by 
living in Africa and interacting with them in their natural state. This is 
fascinating material though received sceptically at the time by Western 
scientists as Garner's observational reports were mixed up with reports 
by Africans presumed incapable of credible testimony. Thorndike's work 
on the learning abilities of a range of animals is outlined. The criticism 
that such laboratory work is flawed because of the artificial nature of the 
test situation is elaborated. It is interesting to note however that 
Thorndike's studies of monkey's learning abilities prompted his claim in 
1901 that 'the monkey justifies his inclusion with man in a separate 
mental genus'. The experimental work of Haggerty and Hamilton with 
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monkeys early in this century is also discussed. The final hundred pages 
deals with recent attempts at communication between people and apes, 
carefully unearthing the assumptions often made here. The Kellogs' 
study of the chimpanzee Gua in their home and the Hayes' study of the 
chimpanzee Viki also living in their home revealed a great deal about 
chimpanzees' abilities but the studies failed in their attempts to teach 
human speech. The Gardners' attempts to communicate with the 
chimpanzee Washoe and the  Patterson's with the gorilla Koko, both met 
with much greater success using sign language.  Terrace's study of the 
chimpanzee Nim also revealed Nim's competence in using signs but 
Terrace was unsure of Nim's ability to create a sentence and generated 
some scepticism about ape/human communication studies in general.  
 
The second generation of chimpanzees in communication studies which 
Candland claims focused on meaning, are then outlined. The Premacks' 
studies of Sarah and other chimpanzees provide credible examples of 
meaningful communications especially related to lying and deception. 
Duane Rumbaugh and others' attempts to communicate with another 
chimpanzee also using an artificial language and the even more 
surprising results with the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin with the 
investigator Savage Rumbaugh also help overcome earlier scepticism 
and generate more sophisticated questions. The research with the bonobo 
Kanzi is only briefly mentioned which is disappointing given the extent 
and originality of his purported communication with Sue Savage 
Rumbaugh.  
 
It is good to bring all this empirical material together but it is only 
related to the psychologies in the vaguest of ways; for example, the 
accounts of animals' communications often bring in perceptions and 
phenomenology is concerned with the study of perceptions. Candland's 
conclusion is surely correct however that there is much more to find out 
about animal/ human communication and that the studies should take 
more account of how human categories of thought affect outcomes.  
 
Candland is an oblique sort of thinker making his writing unpredictable 
and interesting but also a little frustrating if you prefer writers to follow 
their aims in a straight forward manner. The book is unwieldy but it 
opens up reflection in a multiplicity of directions. Even though it is 
already a long book it would have been good to consider the story of 
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Jeanie, a modern Kasper Hauser and the investigations into 
human/dolphin communication along with the material Candland covers. 
 
                   Denise Russell 
 
       
Rollin, Bernard E., The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social 
Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals, xiv + 241pp. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1995. 
 
Bernard Rollin is well known for his philosophical writings concerning 
humans' moral obligations to animals (see Animal Rights and Human 
Morality, Second edition, (N.Y: Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1992) and 
The Unheeded Cry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). The 
Unheeded Cry  is a brilliant analysis of the culture of science and how it 
works against the interests of animals. Rollin is not as opposed to the 
genetic engineering of animals as these earlier books might lead one to 
suspect. In The Frankenstein Syndrome he presents such engineering as a 
neutral tool which may be used wisely or not. A suspicion falls over this 
approach if we substitute 'humans' for 'animals' here. It seems that it is 
not possible to view the genetic engineering of humans as a mere tool. 
Yet Rollin comes close to this when he claims that there is nothing 
inherently wrong with human genetic manipulation. Perhaps this just 
highlights the need to speak about specific procedures. While Rollin's 
discussion does get down to specifics in relation to animals he apparently 
regards all procedures as mere tools even when these involve for 
instance, the creation of animal models of human disease. 
  
Rollin is concerned that our ideas about genetic engineering of animals 
not be dominated by the 'Frankenstein Myth'; that the creation of new 
life by scientific intervention must have 'hellish' consequences. He 
believes that the genetic engineering of animals has 'patent and 
incalculable social and economic benefits'. He seems to suggest that 
animals may benefit too but he does not clarify this beyond some brief 
speculations about possibly in the future breeding animals to better suit 
current farming practices, e.g.. more content battery chickens, or 
introducing genes for disease resistance.  
 
Rollin also states that genetic engineering of animals cannot now be 
stopped arguing that it is too simple and relatively inexpensive to 
accomplish, and if it were to be banned in the U.S., it would be carried 
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out in less restrictive environments elsewhere. He believes that control of 
the technology is vital because it has the capacity to 'lead to a 
proliferation of animal suffering many orders of magnitude greater than 
what we have seen before'. 
 
Rollin asks why the moral issues connected with genetic engineering 
have not been brought forward by the scientific community itself. He 
suggests that it is very difficult for those immersed in a field to gain the 
necessary distance for such reflection, that the scientific ideology 
outlined in The Unheeded Cry  still dominates, unreceptive to moral 
questions. Rollin argues that science necessarily involves values, e.g. 
epistemic ones but also 'as a social phenomenon and human practice, 
science cannot be isolated from social morality'. 
 
Rollin criticizes claims that genetic engineering is intrinsically wrong. 
While in general Rollin's arguments work well, there are two problematic 
areas. Firstly, in arguing against Rifkin's purported link between 
reductionism and genetic engineering, Rollin says that reductionism is 
metaphysically, epistemologically and even morally wrong. However he 
asserts that genetic engineering need not be connected to reductionism, a 
point with which I agree, yet it seems to be denied by Rollin in his 
Appendix describing genetic engineering. Here he says: 'The blueprint 
for both species' commonality and individuality is carried by the genes, 
which instruct and regulate the animals in how to develop, grow and 
form throughout life'. 
 
Secondly, in his discussion of environmental philosophy and genetic 
engineering, Rollin makes several fallacious moves, most notably not 
taking account of the variety of approaches which constitute 
'environmental philosophy'. His critique of Holmes Rolston's account of 
intrinsic value of natural objects is well worked out, but Val Plumwood's 
position in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature  is not so vulnerable to 
attack. Rollin's approach here reflects the long standing and unnecessary 
conflict between philosophers concerned about animals and those 
concerned about the environment.  
 
A lengthy section in the book examines the potential dangers arising 
from genetic engineering of animals for humans and ecosystems. This is 
wide-ranging and well done except that the tone in places is rather too 
jocular for the subject matter. There is a strong argument for public 
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involvement in decisions about acceptance, rejection or monitoring of 
genetic engineering of animals and some practical suggestions for 
regulatory structures. He points out the lack of current regulation in the 
commercial domain.  
 
About one third of the book is given over to ethical considerations in 
relation to animals that arise from genetic engineering and some very 
sensible discussion of how to provoke changes in attitudes. Rollin claims 
that he is moving beyond talk of kindness vs cruelty to develop an ethics 
of rights applicable to animals. However he does not answer or even 
discuss the hard questions about a rights-based philosophy. Some law 
reforms are suggested which if implemented, would provide some good 
safeguards. These reforms are not contingent upon the acceptance of a 
rights philosophy.  
 
As one of the first major works devoted to ethical questions concerning 
the use of animals in genetic engineering this book is to be praised. It is 
very informative and provides a good start to thinking about 
philosophical issues. As an attempt to explode the Frankenstein Myth 
however the book is a failure 
          Denise Russell 
 
BOOK NOTES 
 
   
Masson, Jeffrey and McCarthy, Susan,When Elephants Weep: The 
Emotional Lives of Animals , 268pp. (Jonathan Cape, London,1994).  
 
Masson, famous for his trenchant critiques of psychiatry, together with 
McCarthy, presents a fascinating series of accounts of emotions in 
animals. The main part of the book is organised around descriptions of 
fear, hope, rage, cruelty, friendship, grief, sadness, happiness, 
compassion, altruism, shame and justice. It is valuable to have this 
material collected together, some of it is well known, much of it is not. 
Detailed notes and references are included. When Animals Weep lacks 
philosophical sophistication: the core concept of emotion is inadequately 
conceptualized and there is only superficial argument concerning the 
attribution of emotions or feelings to animals. Yet it is difficult to put 
down.  
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Adams Carol J. and Donovan, Josephine, editors, Animals and Women: 
Feminist Theoretical Explorations, ix + 381pp., (Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1995. 
 
Animals and Women is a collection of 13 essays by 13 authors on the 
interlocking oppressions of sexism and speciesism. A few of the essays 
have a literary focus but otherwise the specific topics are very diverse 
applying the general theme to science, crime, hunting, pornography, 
abortion, farm animals, and politics. Lynda Birke's essay ,' Exploring the 
Boundaries: Feminism, Animals and Science', develops an important 
critical perspective towards the reluctance of much of the feminist 
literature to challenge conventional ideas about animals. The book 
contains a very useful nine page bibiography of feminist approaches to 
animal issues.  
 
Noble, William  and Davidson, Iain, Human Evolution, Language and 
Mind: A Psychological and Archaeological Inquiry, xiii + 272pp., 
Cambridge University Press,1966.  
 
Noble is a psychologist and Davidson an archaeologist and they attempt 
to unite the two disciplines to outline the process of evolutionary 
emergence of the phenomena of mind, language, and 'higher 
consciousness'. The focus is on humans and other apes and on what 
might count as evidence for language acquisition. This is a careful study 
with some interesting conclusions. The Savage-Rumbaugh research 
findings with Kanzi are discussed but thought not to be generalizable to 
wild primates or the common ancestor as Kanzi's environment (involving 
human communication) is different. Noble and Davidson argue that it is 
the human nature of the interactive context in the case of Kanzi that 
engenders the powers and capacities of mind expressed in that creature. 
The question then shifts from 'can bonobos use language?' to 'is Kanzi 
human?' A positive answer to this question would preserve the authors' 
belief that language is the key to human mentality. It would be 
interesting to juxtapose the direction of this argument with the dolphin 
studies reported for instance in L. Herman, 'Receptive Competencies in 
Language-Trained Animals' in Rosenblatt, J et al eds., Advances in the 
Study of Behavior. It is not quite so plausible to think about of dolphins 
as human. 
